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Bob has a black box that emits a single pure state qudit which is, from his perspective, uniformly distributed.
Alice wishes to give Bob evidence that she has knowledge about the emitted state while giving him little or no
information about it. We show that zero-knowledge evidencing of such knowledge is impossible in quantum
relativistic protocols, extending a previous result of Horodecki et al. We also show that no such protocol can be
both sound and complete. We present a new quantum relativistic protocol which we conjecture to be close to
optimal in security against Alice and which reveals little knowledge to Bob, for large dimension d. We analyse
its security against general attacks by Bob and restricted attacks by Alice.
INTRODUCTION
Zero-knowledge proving is a cryptographic primitive in
which one agent proves a fact to another agent without giv-
ing away any information other than that the fact is true. It
has a wide range of practical applications, particularly in elec-
tronic voting schemes [2] and digital signature schemes [3],
and is also used for a variety of theoretical purposes, such as
showing that a language is easy to prove [4]. Zero-knowledge
proving of knowledge, where Alice is required to prove only
that she knows some fact, without giving Bob any information
about the fact itself, is a particularly useful version of this task
which plays a key role in a number of identification protocols
[5].
Horodecki et al. [6] explored the possibility of what they
called a “zero knowledge convincing protocol on quantum
bit”. In their model, a verifier (henceforth called Bob) knows
he has a single copy of a pure qubit, but has no other infor-
mation about the state. A prover (henceforth called Alice)
wishes to make a prediction that Bob can verify and that will
hold with certainty only if she knows what the state is, with-
out giving Bob any additional information about its identity.
They showed that no non-relativistic protocol involving clas-
sical information exchanges and quantum Alice-to-Bob com-
munications can implement this task securely [6]. They also
discussed some protocols that implement very weak versions
of the task, either giving Bob a great deal of information about
the qubit, or giving him only weak evidence of Alice’s knowl-
edge, or both.
Horodecki et al.’s pioneering discussion was informal on
some points. It did not fully distinguish cases in which Al-
ice has classical knowledge about Bob’s quantum state (e.g.
a classical data string describing it) from cases in which she
has quantum knowledge (e.g. a box able to make only some
fixed number of copies). Nor did it underline that Alice cannot
prove that she knows a precise classical description of a single
quantum state even if she is not concerned about giving Bob
information. This is because the classical information about
the state that can be extracted by measurement is bounded,
and Alice always has a boundedly nonzero chance of guess-
ing this information even if she knows nothing about the state.
(See Theorem 2 below.) Alice may also have a high chance
of guessing the information even if she has only partial infor-
mation about the quantum state – for example, she can predict
the outcome of a complete projective measurement on a qubit
with probability 12 . Similarly, even if she only knows a di-
mension 2 subspace in which a qudit lies, she can still specify
a complete projective measurement whose outcome she can
predict with probability 12 . Moreover, if the state is η and Al-
ice believes it is η′, where the fidelity F (η, η′) is close to 1,
then she is almost as likely to pass any protocol testing her
knowledge of η as she would be if she knew η. Since Bob
only has a single copy of the state, Alice cannot provide more
evidence by repeating a protocol that tests her knowledge. By
contrast, in classical contexts Alice’s chances of success can
typically be made arbitrarily small by iteration, so that one can
reasonably (modulo epsilonics) speak of classical zero knowl-
edge proofs.
Other interesting questions left open include: What can rel-
ativistic protocols achieve? How much evidence can Alice
provide? What bounds exist on the tradeoffs between the evi-
dence Alice provides and the amount of knowledge she gives
away? Are there protocols strong enough for practical crypto-
graphic purposes? How do the answers depend on the dimen-
sion d of the state space?
We explore these questions below, beginning with some
formal definitions. We prove a stronger no-go theorem show-
ing that no protocol that provides non-trivial evidence of Al-
ice’s knowledge about a pure quantum state of finite dimen-
sion can prevent Bob from acquiring some additional knowl-
edge about the state, even in the setting of relativistic quantum
cryptography. We also prove a bound on the strength of ev-
idence Alice can provide. Since proofs of knowledge of a
finite-dimensional quantum state are not possible, and zero-
2knowledge protocols that give some evidence of knowledge
are also not possible, we then consider the weaker but feasible
task of knowledge-concealing evidencing of knowledge about
a quantum state (KCEKQS).
A KCEKQS protocol requires Alice to give Bob evidence
that she has some form of knowledge about a quantum state
whilst giving him incomplete information about the state. Ide-
ally, a successfully completed protocol should give Bob as
much evidence as possible, without assuming Alice’s honesty.
Ideally, too, the protocol should ensure as small a bound as
possible on the information obtainable by Bob, whether or not
it is successfully completed or he honestly follows it. We dis-
cuss some simple protocols, generalising protocols previously
considered by Horodecki et al. [6], and show that they are
relatively weak in knowledge-concealment, or in evidencing
knowledge, or both. We then propose a new relativistic quan-
tum protocol. We show it is secure against restricted attacks
by Alice and general attacks by Bob, for large d, in a sense
we make precise below. We conjecture this remains true for
general attacks by Alice.
DEFINITIONS
We assume for now that Alice has no option to abort
the protocol; allowing an abort option does not significantly
change our main results [1].
A non-relativistic knowledge-concealing evidencing of
knowledge about a quantum state (KCEKQS) protocol in-
volves two mistrustful parties, Alice and Bob, occupying dis-
joint secure laboratories. We assume that each party has
trusted error-free devices in their own laboratory; both parties
trust error-free classical and quantum communication chan-
nels between the laboratories; we consider errors and losses
later [1]. Bob begins in possession of a quantum system QB
known to be prepared in some pure state η = |η〉 〈η| drawn
uniformly at random from QB . The protocol requires Alice
and Bob to act on alternate rounds and terminates after a fixed
finite number of rounds. Each round may require a party to
carry out unitary operations and/or measurements on a quan-
tum system in their possession and/or to send classical and/or
quantum information to the other party. The protocol may
specify that these actions are probabilistically determined, ac-
cording to given probability distributions. The final round of
the protocol requires Bob to generate one of two possible out-
comes, 0 and 1, from the classical and quantum information
in his possession. These correspond to Bob’s rejecting or ac-
cepting that Alice has provided evidence of knowledge about
η. We write p(0) and p(1) for the outcome probabilities.
In a relativistic KCEKQS protocol, each party may have
several trusted agents occupying separate secure laboratories,
with secure communications between them, lying within pre-
agreed regions. One agent of Bob’s initially possesses QB .
The protocol requires Alice’s and Bob’s agents to carry out
unitary operations and/or measurements on quantum systems
in their possession and to send classical and/or quantum com-
munications to given other agents of the same party and/or the
other party, within their agreed location regions and within
agreed time intervals. The protocol may specify these actions
are probabilistically determined, according to given probabil-
ity distributions. The protocol terminates after a fixed finite
number of such actions. The final prescribed action is for one
of Bob’s agents to generate one of two possible outcomes, 0
and 1, from the classical and quantum information in his pos-
session, as above.
We will characterise the efficiency of an ideal KCEKQS
protocol by three parameters C, K and S; we discuss other
relevant features of KCEKQS protocols in the supplementary
material [1]. When evaluating these parameters for specific
protocols, we will mostly consider the ideal case of error-
free devices and channels. In realistic implementations, chan-
nel noise, device errors and losses may alter the parameter
values.[14] However, our no-go theorems below still hold in
reasonable models of noise, errors and losses, so long as these
are uncorrelated with η and with any knowledge Alice may
have of or about η.
We define our parameters by the following criteria, in each
case averaging over η:
• Completeness: If Alice has a precise classical descrip-
tion of η and both parties perform the protocol correctly,
then p(1) = 1− C.
• Soundness: If Alice has no classical or quantum infor-
mation about the state η, then S is the supremum of
p(1) over all possible (honest or dishonest) strategies
for Alice, assuming that Bob performs the protocol cor-
rectly.
• Knowledge-concealing: Suppose that Alice performs
the protocol correctly and at the start of the protocol
Bob knows nothing about the state η. Then K is the
supremum of the expected squared fidelity F 2(η, φ) =
| 〈η|φ〉 |2 over (honest or dishonest) strategies that give
Bob the value of a pure state φ as a guess for η.
Let M be the supremum of the same expected squared fi-
delity obtainable by Bob if he does not take part in the pro-
tocol and carries out quantum operations and measurements
on QB . We call K − M the knowledge gain available from
the protocol to a dishonest Bob. We say the protocol is zero-
knowledge if K = M, We say it is non-trivial if 1− C > S.
As defined above, general protocols allow both classical
and quantum communications in both directions. We will also
consider examples with more restricted communications. Ex-
tending the discussion of Ref. [6], we consider classical pro-
tocols, in which Alice and Bob employ only classical commu-
nication, quantum A-to-B protocols, which additionally allow
quantum communications from A to B, and similarly quantum
B-to-A protocols.
3NO-GO THEOREMS
Horodecki et al. [6] showed that no non-relativistic
KCEKQS classical or quantum A-to-B protocol for an un-
known qubit has C = 0, S < 1, and is zero-knowledge. We
establish here a considerably more general result, applying to
relativistic KCEKQS protocols for qudits with two-way clas-
sical and/or quantum communications, and general parame-
ter values. Our statements apply to protocols whose security
is based only on quantum theory and special relativity, i.e.
within the standard scenario for unconditionally secure rela-
tivistic quantum cryptography [8].
Theorem 1. There exists no non-trivial zero-knowledge
KCEKQS protocol. [1]
The proof of this theorem depends on the fact that in any
KCEKQS protocol, Bob may always attempt to cheat by re-
placingQB with a system prepared in a state known to him. In
heuristic terms, for a non-trivial protocol the probability that
Alice nonetheless produces a correct proof is higher if Bob
fortuitously chooses a state which is close in Hilbert space to
η, and hence Alice’s success or failure gives Bob non-zero
information about the identity of the unknown state. Since
he has retained a copy of the unknown state he can addition-
ally perform a measurement on it, and combining information
from these two processes gives him on average strictly more
information than is available from the measurement alone. In
the supplementary information we formalize this argument
and generalize it to cover the case where Alice is allowed to
abort the protocol.
We also establish a relationship between completeness and
soundness which bounds the degree of evidence Alice can
provide:
Theorem 2. For any qudit KCEKQS protocol, S1−C ≥ 1d . [1]
The proof of this theorem depends on the fact that in any
KCEKQS protocol, if Alice does not in fact know the state η,
she may always attempt to cheat by choosing a random state
φ from the Hilbert space of QB and proceeding with the pro-
tocol as if she knows that QB is in the state φ. We show in
the supplementary information that the probability of success
by this strategy is lower bounded by 1d (1− C). Hence in any
KCEKQS protocol there is inevitably a tradeoff between mini-
mizing the probability that a dishonest Alice manages to cheat
and maximizing the probability that an honest Alice manages
to produce a successful proof.
In particular, theorem 2 means that for small d, S and C
cannot both be close to 0, regardless of the value of K. This
makes the case of large d particularly interesting to explore.
We observe that the bound of theorem 2 is tight. For ex-
ample, it is attained by a protocol in which Alice predicts to
Bob the outcome of a projective measurement that includes η
on the system QB : this has S = 1d and C = 0. More gen-
erally, it is attained for a protocol in which Alice is required
to predict this outcome and also predict the outcome of some
independent random event with success probability p: this has
S =
p
d and C = 1− p. We say a KCEKQS qudit protocol is
CS-optimal if S = 1d , C = 0.
PROTOCOLS
Classical A-to-B
As noted above, Horodecki et al. [6] argue that non-trivial
non-relativistic zero-knowledge classical A-to-B protocols
with C = 0 are impossible for a qubit. In any such proto-
col, Alice must predict some measurement outcome, and any
measurement prediction that holds with certainty for a pure
qubit η and is not certain for a random qubit allows Bob to
identify η exactly, and so has K = 1.
One might instead consider protocols with C > 0, in which
Alice chooses a projective measurement which includes a ran-
domly chosen projector P from those with 〈η|P |η〉 = 1− C.
One might also consider strengthening such protocols by al-
lowing Alice to use a secure relativistic bit commitment [7–
11] to commit her predicted outcome, unveiling this commit-
ment if and only if Bob’s reported outcome agrees with her
prediction. However, such protocols still have either K or C
large [1].
Quantum A-to-B
Horodecki et al. [6] also consider a protocol where Alice
gives Bob a copy of η; as they note, such protocols can achieve
C = 0 and K < 1. Indeed it is possible to achieve K  1
for large d. In this sense, for large d, their protocol outper-
forms the classical A-to-B protocols just discussed. However,
one needs to consider the tradeoffs between K, C and S. It is
also worth highlighting that this protocol requires Alice only
to possess quantum information about η rather than classical
information. Alice can ensure p(1) = 1 even if she only has
a black box that will make only a single copy of η and has no
other classical or quantum information about η.
We extend the discussion of Ref. [6] by considering a gen-
eralisation of their protocol in which Alice gives BobN copes
of η:
1. Alice prepares N systems {Si} in the state η and gives
them to Bob.
2. Bob performs a measurement {ΠS , I− ΠS} where ΠS
is the projector onto the symmetric subspace of the joint
state space of the {Si} and QB .[15]
3. If the result is ΠS , Bob accepts; otherwise he rejects.
If Alice knows η and follows the protocol, Bob will accept,









4while, for N large, S → 1d , so the protocol tends to CS-
optimality in this limit. However, we also show [1] that K =
N+2






and K − M > d−1d+1 NN+2 1dS for all d,N , which
are relatively poor tradeoffs. In particular, near CS-optimality
(S ≈ 1d ) implies near-zero concealment (K ≈ 1) and implies
significant knowledge gain (K − M ≈ d−1d+1 ).
A quantum B-to-A protocol
We now propose a new KCEKQS protocol that involves
quantum B-to-A and two way classical communication. The
protocol is relativistic, meaning that ‘Alice’ and ‘Bob’ repre-
sent two separate networks of collaborating agents distributed
in space-time. In our protocol, Alice and Bob each have two
agents, A1, A2 andB1, B2, configured such that d(A1, B1) ≈
d(A2, B2) d(A1, B2) ≈ d(A2, B1)[16]
1. Alice and Bob agree in advance on positive integer se-
curity parameters N and q.
2. Bob preparesN quantum systems {Si} in states chosen
uniformly at random.
3. Bob randomly permutes the systems {Si} and the sys-
tem QB , assigns them all indices from 1 to N + 1, and
then gives all N + 1 systems, labelled by their indices,
to Alice.
4. Alice carries out the projective measurement {η , I−η}
on each of the N + 1 systems that Bob gave her. Write
C ′ for the list of indices for which she obtains outcome
η; let |C ′| = q′. If q′ ≤ q, she forms a list C = C ′ ∪D,
where D is a list of (q− q′) copies of the dummy index
0.[17]. If q′ > q, she picks a random size q sublist C of
C ′.
5. Alice randomly permutes C and then performs q rel-
ativistic bit string commitments [1] committing her to
each of the indices in the permuted list. Each bit string
commitment is set up so that Alice can commit to any
index in {0, 1, 2, . . . N + 1}.
6. Bob tells Alice the index x ∈ {1, . . . , N + 1} that he
assigned to QB .
7. If x ∈ C, Alice unveils her commitment to that index.
Otherwise she announces failure and Bob rejects.[18]
8. If Alice’s unveiled commitment is indeed x, Bob ac-
cepts. Otherwise he rejects.
In the supplementary information we give an analysis of
the security of this protocol. We show that for any possible
attack by Bob, K ≤ 4d+1 , while M = 2d+1 , so K → 0 and
K − M → 0 for large d [1], meaning that the protocol is
asmptotically secure against Bob. To analyse security against
Alice we treat the bit commitment subprotocol as a ‘black
box’ which we assume to be secure under composition[19],
meaning that Alice is restricted to strategies in which she com-
mits to q classical values chosen from {0, . . . , N +1} and un-
veils one of these committed values. We show that under this
security assumption, S ≈ 1d , and if the parameter q is cho-
sen to be dNd e, then in the limit of large N we have C → 0
for q = bNd c; hence the protocol asymptotically tends to CS-
optimality. A full security analysis requires a complete anal-
ysis of general quantum operations Alice could carry out to
produce unveiling data; we leave this for future work.
CONCLUSION
We have proven two no-go theorems demonstrating that
even in the relativistic setting there is no perfect KCEKQS
protocol for quantum states of finite dimension and bound-
ing the evidence Alice can supply. We have also described
a new protocol involving quantum Bob-to-Alice communica-
tions and relativistic signalling constraints, which appears to
achieve a significant improvement on existing protocols for
large d. Although it is not zero knowledge for finite d, it re-
veals little extra information to Bob for large d. We conjecture
that it is asymptotically CS-optimal, i.e. offers essentially op-
timal security against Alice. We anticipate that this protocol
may be a valuable quantum cryptographic primitive in con-
texts where marginal revelations of information to Bob are
acceptable.
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